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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis I examine the challenges posed by Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) developments on the law and practice of admissibility of 
documentary evidence by Tanzanian courts. Particular focus is put on the issues of 
admissibility of computer printouts in courts. The main argument advanced in this thesis 
is that the Tanzania Evidence Act, 1967(the TEA), being developed without reference to 
digital technologies, is inadequate to govern the admissibility of computer printouts 
with sensible results. 
 
The methodology of data collection deployed in this thesis is predominantly 
documentary review. Throughout, I have made substantial reference to the landmark 
case in   Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd versus Le-Marsh Enterprises Ltd and Others to 
analyze the legal issues emerging from dealing with computer printouts in the 
courtroom when their admissibility is at issue. This case is the only available decision in 
Tanzania to deal with admissibility of computer printouts. 
 
In fulfilling the above mission, this thesis is organized in five Chapters. Chapter One 
sets out the aims of the thesis, background information to the problem of admissibility 
of computer printouts in courts, and literature review of previous works on the subject. 
The notion of electronic document is treated in Chapter Two. Chapter Three specifically 
focuses on bankers’ books as a result of the landmark case cited above. Chapter Four 
briefly reviews the evidentiary rules of admissibility of documentary evidence: the best 
evidence rule, the rule against hearsay and authentication at common law and under the 
TEA, 1967. It also deals with an interpretative approach of Tanzanian courts in 
admitting computer printouts in the form of bankers’ books. Chapter Five comprises 
concluding remarks and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Aims of the Thesis 
The central aim of this thesis is to cast light on the current problems of adducing 
documentary evidence in the form of computer printouts before the Tanzanian courts. 
The thesis has also a law reformist ambition, that is, it seeks to push for amendment of 
the TEA, so that the Act may keep abreast with the development of the new 
technologies, particularly the computer. It is also the aim of this thesis to fill the gaps of 
the pre-existing discussion on the admissibility of electronic evidence1 generally.  
1.2 Background to the Problem 
 
In 1967 when the TEA was being enacted, there were hardly any computers in 
Tanzania. The only computer which was available in the country was installed in the 
Ministry of Finance.2 During this period both public and private businesses were using 
traditional paper for keeping business records, communications of letters, memos, etc. 
Individuals were also using similar papers for various purposes like communication by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 In this thesis electronic evidence and computer printouts are sometimes used interchangeably, this is 
despite the fact that the latter term is embraced in the former.  
2 Mgaya, K, “Development of Informatics in Tanzania” in Foster, F.G and Drew, E.P (eds) Information 
Technology in Selected Countries: Reports from Ireland, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Tanzania, The United 
Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, 1994 at p. 134.See also Nielinger, O. Creating an Environment for ICT 
in Tanzania-Policy, Regulation and Markets p. 11 at http://www.tanzaniagateway.org/docs . 
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letters and keeping records of transactions they made. In the prevailing circumstances 
the legislators were not concerned much with enacting a piece of legislation that would 
regulate the admissibility of computer printouts in court. Thus the fundamental rules of 
admissibility of documentary evidence notably the rules on best evidence, hearsay and 
authentication had been consistently applied in the traditional paper context with 
sensible results.3   
 
A change of scene occurred in the 1990s following the proliferation of computers in the 
country and their increasing usage in both public and private businesses. With computer 
technology, communications through emails, record keeping in computer databases, 
data processing, to mention but a few examples, have radically transformed the reliance 
of use of traditional paper to computer amid the greater advantages of the computer 
system. In Tanzania computers are put into four main uses. These include processing of 
accounting data, processing research and survey data, teaching and specialized 
applications.4 Individual uses of computers are also increasing at a rocketing rate as 
computer literacy is growing in the country. 
 
While the computer technology seems to have simplified work on mankind and 
businesses in a number of aspects, the admissibility of documentary evidence in courts 
has been put at a cross-road. Hot debates among legal academics, lawyers and policy 
makers on admissibility of computer printouts in court have been a common place 
especially after the ruling in the Tanzanian case of  Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd v.  Le-
Marsh Enterprises Ltd and Others5. The central agenda of these debates are the notions 
of document and originality, and the application of the traditional rules of documentary 
evidence in the computerized context.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 See: Chapter Four. 
4 Mgaya, op cit, pp 145-146. 
5 Commercial Case No. 4 of 2000, In the High Court of Tanzania (Commercial Division) at Dar es 
salaam, Unreported. 
  
 3
                                                
 
With all these challenges springing out of the widespread use of computers in Tanzania 
and the increasing practice of tendering computer printouts in courts as evidence, 
magistrates, judges, attorneys and advocates have been seriously left in dilemma. There 
was an objection in an attempt to tender computer printout in Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd 
but this was overruled. 
 
Be as it may, the admissibility of computer printouts is a new phenomenon in our 
courts. In the absence of specific provisions of law in the area, magistrates and judges 
have strived to develop the law by interpreting the traditional rules broadly to take 
account of the new technologies. This has not been an easy task for the judiciary. There 
are a number of issues which need clarification under our legal system as reliance on 
computer printouts by litigants in court is also growing at a rapid speed. 
 
1.3  Statement of the Problem 
 
The statement of the problem tabled by this thesis is that the TEA is inadequate to 
regulate the admissibility of computer printouts in courts with sensible results. The 
inadequacy of the TEA concerns three interrelated problems. First, computer data and 
printouts as concepts do not fit well within the language of the statute. This is partly 
because the statute was enacted without any reference to electronic document6. There 
has been an attempt by the judiciary to broaden the definition of bankers’ book to 
include computer printouts in Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd, but this too has not sufficiently 
illuminated light on the notion of electronic document. Secondly, the originality 
criterion inherent in the notion of document is still vague such that it is difficult to 
distinguish copy from original in the computerised context. It is not clear whether 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Electronic document includes computer data and computer printouts. 
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computer printouts are original documents or copies. Thirdly, the rules of admissibility 
under the TEA which are mostly a codification of common law principles are not 
sufficiently flexible to allow the admissibility of computer printouts.  
 
1.4  Methodology 
 
This thesis relied on documentary evidence as the dominant source of data collection. A 
chain of literature including books, articles, journals, and theses were consulted to 
retrieve knowledge on treatment of computer printouts in courtrooms when the question 
of admissibility is at issue. To achieve this, the Faculty of Law Library of the University 
of Oslo offered a fertile ground for documentary review. Also the libraries of the High 
Court of Tanzania and University of Dar es salaam gave supporting research grounds as 
far as case law and previous theses are concerned. As most articles, journals, etc are 
available electronically, various websites were also consulted. 
 
The available case law decided by the Tanzanian courts7 was also consulted for 
analogous reasoning. Some comparison with law and cases decided in other common 
law jurisdictions like USA, UK, India, Republic of South Africa and Nigeria was also 
embarked upon for illustrative purposes and not as a standard of law to be adopted. 
 
The main reasons for opting for documentary review as the dominant source of data 
collection for this thesis are limited resources and time. The base of my research was at 
the NRCCL in Oslo, Norway. This means sufficient resources were needed to engage in 
extensive interviews and administer questionnaires to respondents in Tanzania. I lacked 
these resources! Again, the time dedicated to the writing of a master thesis, the summer 
period, was short to allow me to deploy the other methods of data collection. Finally, 
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the use of other methods of data collection was disproportionate in terms of the 
expected benefits that could be achieved by this thesis.   
 
1.5  Literature Review 
 
Until now literature on the operation of the TEA regarding the admissibility in evidence 
of computer printouts is scarce. However, given the nature of the problem and the 
complexity of issues underpinning this area, this section reviews the few existing pieces 
of literature from Tanzania and selected foreign jurisdictions to define the nature and 
dimension of the problem. The latter countries include the USA and UK. The reasons 
for selection of these countries are first and foremost, that these countries share similar 
legal system and tradition with Tanzania: the common law legal system. Besides, they 
are also the pioneers in addressing the problem dealt with in this thesis.   
 
In the article, Tanzania: Admissibility of Electronic Evidence8 which is intended as a 
piece of advice to foreign businesses in Tanzania, Sinare (2005) briefly comments on 
the operation of the TEA regarding the admissibility of computer printouts in court. The 
author reviews the ruling in Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd. It is her contention that the TEA 
does not recognize electronic documents as admissible evidence whether primary or 
secondary. She rules out the possibility of extending the traditional rules and concepts 
to electronic documents. 
 
This article suffers two limitations. First, it does not reveal the nature of the problem 
posed by computer printouts when applying the traditional rules of admissibility of 
documentary evidence: the best evidence rule, hearsay and authentication. These are 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 The Court of Appeal of Tanzania ( the Tanzania’s supreme court) and the High Court ( subordinate to 
the Court of Appeal). 
8 http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=35390&shownav=0 . 
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key issues raised in this thesis. Secondly, the article takes for granted that electronic 
evidence covers only computer printouts. With this generalization, the author fails to 
appreciate that there are other forms of electronic evidence like digital audio, voice 
mail, program codes, instant messages, digital photographs, electronic images or global 
positioning system information9, whose admissibility as evidence do not necessarily 
implicate the rules governing admissibility of documentary evidence.  
 
Tapper (1989)10 is among the leading scholars to write on the interplay between 
computer and the law of evidence. He makes two important points on the admissibility 
of evidence derived from computers. The first point is that in common law jurisdictions 
the adducement of evidence is the prerogative of the parties, regulated by general rules 
rather than arbitrary individual decision in each specific case. This raises problems in 
dealing with computer evidence. The second point made by Tapper is that if evidence 
derived from computers is to be adduced, conditions must define the form in which the 
evidence is to be tendered and how its authenticity is to be established, at least as a 
preliminary matter. 
 
The issues raised by the learned author illuminate the potential problems of handling 
electronic evidence generally and possible solutions in overcoming the same. These 
issues are relevant as they point towards a common direction to my thesis. 
 
Rice (2004)11 has written on matters covering issues relating to electronic evidence 
generally. He provides useful insights on the application of the rules of admissibility of 
documentary evidence in a computerized context. This book however suffers some 
limitations when it comes to the notions of document, original and copy. It does not 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 Nancy, J. and Miller, S.L, ‘The Electronic Evolution of Evidence’, Journal for Reporting and 
Captioning Professions’, September 2004, pp. 54-57, at p.55. 
10 Tapper, C. Computer Law, 4th Edition, Longman (London and New York), 1989. 
11 Rice P.R. Electronic Evidence: Law and Practice, American Bar Association, Chicago, 2004. 
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address these issues. Probably this is because under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
1975(FRE) the legal position regarding these notions is well settled.  
 
Gahtan (1999) has written a book entitled: Electronic Evidence12. The text reviews 
extensively the general issues surrounding the admissibility and use of electronic 
evidence at trial, particularly computer-produced documents. In a special way the author 
has addressed the issue of whether or not a computer printout is an original or copy. He 
notes that there is no consistency in approach between US and Canada. Under the FRE 
computer printouts are treated as original documents. But there are states in the US 
which treat computer printouts as copies. This comprises of such states which have not 
yet implemented the FRE. The author observes that similar pattern occurs in Canada.  
 
The books of Rice and Gahtan provide a broad knowledge of admissibility of electronic 
evidence in the USA, UK, and Canada. They raise similar issues to my thesis thus 
provide useful background to the law and practice in other common law jurisdictions.   
 
Peritz (1986)13 has extensively discussed the authentication of computerized business 
records under the FRE. The main thesis advanced by the author is that computerized 
business records should equally be subjected to the authentication rule by meeting a 
comprehensive foundation requirement before they are offered as evidence in court. The 
rationale for this proposition, according to the author, are two: first, that the current 
practice of admissibility of business records simply does not accord the objecting part a 
fair chance to argue the reliability question, and second is the practical limitation of the 
computer systems.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Gahtan, A.M. Electronic Evidence, Carswell, Canada, 1999. 
13 Peritz, R.J, ‘Computer Data and Reliability: A Call for Authentication of Business Records under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence’ in Computer/Law Journal, Vol.VII, No.1, Summer1986, pp.23-72. 
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While this article dwells on the authentication rule, my thesis goes further to consider 
the other two rules of admissibility of evidence namely, the best evidence and hearsay. 
This is because admissibility of documentary evidence is to be considered in all 
parameters and not on the basis of authentication rule alone. The other limitation is that, 
this article is confined only to business records. It is noted here that not every computer 
printout qualifies as a business record. Thus the present thesis considers computer 
printouts very broadly. 
 
It must be noted that the pieces of literature considered in this section are not an 
exhaustive list. Their selection has been motivated by the fact that they cover issues 
canvassed in my thesis. There is however another reason. It is not possible to review 
every piece of literature relating to admissibility of electronic evidence in a thesis with a 
strict word limit like the present one. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2 The Notion of Document 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The central theme of Chapter Two concerns definitional problems associated with the 
notion of document in a computerised context. More specifically, this chapter describes 
the meaning of document in relation to computer data, soft copy and computer printouts. 
It also attempts a classification of such document along the lines of public vis-à-vis 
private as well as copy vis-à-vis original. The issues described in this Chapter are only 
relevant as they set the ground for the application of the rules of admissibility of 
documentary evidence in court.  The theme of admissibility of document in court is 
taken up partly in Chapter Three and in details in Chapter Four. 
 
2.2 Grounding the Concept ‘Document’ 
 
The question of what exactly may constitute a document is far from easy to answer, and 
appears not to be capable of being answered uniformly for all purposes.14In the so 
called Digital Age the efforts to achieve a standard definition of the term have not 
yielded much.15 In the following, I review a few definitions of the term document as 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 Murphy, P. Murphy on Evidence, 9th Edition, Oxford University Press, United States, 2005, p. 582. 
15 There is no international or regional instrument in Europe which attempts to define the term 
‘document’. Although Article 9 of the Electronic Commerce Directive, Directive 2000/31/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society 
Services removes obstacles for contracts concluded by electronic means, the same omits to define the 
term ‘document’ and/or ‘electronic document’.  
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considered by authors of legal literature; statutes, the most important of them the TEA 
and case law. It should be noted that these definitions are not exhaustive. Their selection 
has been influenced by the fact that they provide clear distillations of the main criteria 
of the term document.  
 
The simplest definition of the term document is provided in Black’s Law Dictionary.16 
According to this, document means something tangible on which words, symbols, or 
marks are recorded. 
 
Analyzing the above definition three criteria are set out for a document to exist in the 
domain of the law of evidence. The first criterion is tangibility; the second is 
permanence and the third is inscription of words, symbols, or marks.  
 In assessing whether or not certain material is tangible regard must be made to the 
following considerations: what is meant by ‘tangibility’? Who determines the 
‘tangibility’? By what means? And is there a specific duration to warrant ‘tangibility’?  
There is little guidance from the above definition to answer the questions raised in 
connection to ‘tangibility’. The definition of the term document under the TEA employs 
the same criterion. In this piece of legislation the term document is defined as: 
 
‘Any writing, handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostat, 
photograph and every recording upon any tangible thing, any form of 
communication or representation by letters, figures, marks or symbols 
or by more than one of these means, which my be used for the purpose 
of recording any matter provided that such recording is reasonably 
permanent and readable by sight.’17(Emphasis supplied) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 Gardner, B.A(ed) (et al), Black’s Law Dictionary, Eight Edition, Thomson West, U.S.A, 2004, p. 519. 
17 Section 3(1) (d) of TEA. 
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It appears from the above definitions that the plain meaning of tangibility relates to the 
physical existence of certain material object. The presence of a physical medium like 
paper, wall, computer screen (monitor), etc is essential to make certain material 
tangible. Tangibility must also be assessed using human sensory organs. In other words, 
one should ask whether the material in question can be touched and/or perceived by 
human eye.  
 
As to the consideration of duration in relation to tangibility, the provision of the TEA 
does not tell much. However guidance as to the duration of tangibility may be 
ascertained in the light of the second criterion.  
 
The second criterion is record. This simply means that the writings, symbols or marks 
must have permanence such that the medium and its contents remain in the state of 
physical existence for all time in future. In the provision of the TEA this criterion is 
formulate as ‘…recording is reasonably permanent’. It is not clear what is meant by 
reasonably. In my view the term reasonably suggests that recording may only be 
permanent in a logical and sensible manner. This meaning seems to be too abstract but 
practical when consideration is made to the operation of the computer.18 When the first 
criterion of tangibility is considered in the light of the second criterion it logically 
follows that the duration of tangibility must also be permanent as opposed to transitory. 
 
The third criterion for the existence of a document is the inscription of words, symbols, 
or marks on the material object. These are sometimes referred to as contents of a 
document. Whenever a question of documentary evidence arises the contents of a 
document become the subject matter of proof.19  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 See: subsequent discussion in this section. 
19 See: Further discussion in Chapter Four. 
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The TEA provides an additional criterion for a document to exist, that is, words, 
symbols, or marks must be readable by sight.20 This criterion is not found in the 
definition provided by Black’s Law Dictionary cited above, nor is it found in the bulk of 
evidence legislation of common law countries.21  
 
Few questions need consideration with regard to the above criterion. For example, what 
is meant by ‘readable by sight’? Does the ‘tangibility’ criterion encompass 
‘readability’? Or are the two conditions distinct and separate?  
The plain meaning of readability is looking at written or printed words or symbols and 
understand their meaning.22  In this definition there is an element of ability to 
understand the words, symbols and marks inscribed on a physical medium and not just 
to perceive them by a human eye. This condition is in line with the object of tendering 
documents in courts for purposes of proving their contents. It could be illogical if the 
contents of the documents tendered in courts were incapable of conveying a particular 
meaning. But does this mean that the definitions of document which omit this condition 
do not entail the element of understand of the contents of such documents when they 
are perceived by a human eye? In my view the answer must be in the negative. This is 
because tangibility whose one aspect is the ability to perceive by human eye overlaps 
with readability. In addition the readability criterion has never attracted attention of 
legal academics probably because the same concept overlaps with tangibility.23  
 
The question which arises now is: how should the above criteria be applied in the 
computerised context? In other words, can computer data and/or computer printouts 
constitute the definition of document within the meaning of section 3(1) (d) of the TEA? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 See also: US FRE. 
21 See: for example, the UK Civil Evidence Act, 1995, The Zanzibar Evidence Act, Cap. 5, the Nigerian 
Evidence Act, Chapter 112. 
22 Wehmeier, S. (ed) (et al), Oxford ADVANCED LEARNER’S Dictionary, 7th Edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2005, p.1254. 
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Unfortunately there is no direct case law decided by the Tanzanian courts on this 
point.24 As I have mentioned in section 1.4 the absence of relevant case law from 
Tanzanian courts dealing with electronic evidence will make much of the analysis in 
this thesis draw illustrations from other common law countries. Thus the same approach 
is taken up in the subsequent discussion of the definition of document in a computer 
environment.  
 
In order to answer the above question consideration of the operation of the computer is 
unavoidable. Carey (1979)25 explains extensively the process of computer operation, in 
the following I summarise it in a simplified version.  
 
The process begins by data being keyed in the computer through the keyboard. These 
data are sent to the Central Processing Unit (CPU) of the computer in electronic signals. 
The CPU turns the signals into binary code, that is ones and zeros. Then the computer 
reads the code and sends it on to the monitor to display the information. A text of the 
information held in a computer machine can subsequently be printed on paper using a 
printer or stored in devices like discs. 
 
The above summary of computer operation exposes two important points in relation to 
our question. The first point is that, when data are keyed into the computer machine 
through the keyboard, they are converted into ones and zeros (binary code) by a specific 
computer software. From computer science point of view the binary code is machine 
readable only. It should also be added that the binary code are also intangible. In these 
circumstances can computer data and/or computer printouts constitute document within 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 My review of case law from Tanzanian courts on admissibility of documentary evidence has failed to 
reveal specifically that ‘readability’ has been at issue. 
24 The only available decision of Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd versus Le-Marsh Enterprises Ltd and Others 
(supra) deals with the admissibility of computer printout in the context of Bankers’ Books.  
25 Carey, D, How It Works...The Computer, Ladybird Books Ltd, Boughborough, 1979. 
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the meaning of section 3(1) (d) of the TEA? Let us start our discussion by considering 
the position of computer data first. 
 
It is clear that computer data held in the machine are represented in binary code, that is, 
ones and zeros. Since the binary code can not be said to be tangible and readable by 
human eye the same falls short of the criteria of the term document set out in the cited 
provision of the TEA. In this regard an argument can be that computer data are not 
document in terms of section 3(1) (d) of the TEA. However as a point of departure the 
USA has made it specific in the FRE that computer data constitute ‘writings’ and/or 
‘recordings’26. It is interesting to note that in the USA the term document is not used in 
the FRE. However the terms writings and recordings have similar meaning to 
document. It is not known which criteria were used to include computer data in the list 
of definition of writings and recordings.27 My argument is that such classification can 
be justified on the ground of practical expedience than adhering to the letters of law. 
This approach however requires to be settled by the courts of law especially in 
jurisdictions like Tanzania where the TEA does not clearly and specifically stipulate 
that computer data constitute document28. 
 
Support for my argument can be found in the definition of document in the UK Civil 
Evidence Act, 199529(CEA). In terms of section 13 of the CEA a document is defined 
as anything in which information of any description is recorded. This definition seems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 In terms of rule 1001(1) of the US FRE ‘writings’ and ‘recordings’ consist of letters, words, or 
numbers, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, 
magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data compilation. 
27 Unfortunately I failed to have access to preparatory works behind the FRE which would throw light on 
the rationale of classifying computer data as document. 
28 In Tanzania there has been no direct case law decided by the Court of Appeal of Tanzania nor the High 
Court of Tanzania with regard to the status of ‘computer data’. 
29 See also: UK Criminal Justice Act, 2003.  
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to be influenced by the leading case in R v. Daye30 where Darling J (as he then was) 
held:  
 
‘A document is any written thing capable of being evidence, and... it is 
immaterial on what the writing may be inscribed. It might be inscribed 
on paper, as it is the common case now; but the common case once 
was that it was not on paper, but on parchment; and long before that it 
was on stone, marble, on clay, and it might be, and often was, on 
metal’ .  
 
The UK definition of the term document is formulated in broad general terms. It does 
not make specific reference to computer data nor does it mention any technology used 
to produce a particular document. The question whether or not computer data constitute 
document in terms of the CEA is also a question of law to be determined by the English 
courts.  
 
Thus it can be argued that even in the absence of a specific reference to computer data 
in the definition of document under section 3(1) (d) of the TEA, the provision can still 
be interpreted broadly to include computer data. As pointed out earlier in this section, 
there are two reasons in line with a broad interpretation. The first reason is based on 
practical expedience. My view is that in the computerised context any contrary 
approach to the one above will result into absurdity and leave computer data 
unregulated by the provisions of the TEA. The second reason is based on the 
implications of classifying computer printout as copy or original document.31 Legal 
literature on electronic evidence and case law on the classification of computer printout 
as copy or original have always assumed that computer data constitute document.32 For 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 (1908) 2KB 333, at 340. 
31 See: Section 2.3.2. 
32 Refer further to footnote 39. 
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example, in Nigeria, it is a settled legal position that a computer printout constitutes a 
copy33. This implies logically but not necessarily that computer data constitute original 
document as behind a copy there must be an original. Thus the above classification 
could not be possible if computer data were not considered to be document in the first 
place. 
 
There is also consensus among most legal academics that computer data constitute 
document. However there have been divergences in their lines of reasoning. For 
example, in reading computer data within section 2 of the Nigerian Evidence Act,34 
Bamodu (2004)35 assigns two reasons. Firstly, the definition is non-exhaustive of what 
amounts to documents because of the use of the word includes. Secondly, the definition 
encompasses within the meaning of document expression by letters, figures or marks on 
any substance, with substance not being confined to tangible substances. 
In my view Bamodu’s arguments can not be reconciled with section 3(1) (d) of the TEA 
for two reasons. Firstly, the formulation of this provision does not contain the word 
includes as it is the case in the Nigerian provision. Secondly, while the Nigerian 
provision omits reference to tangibility the TEA provision does not. 
The second issue for consideration is whether a computer printout constitutes a 
document within the meaning of section 3(1) (d) of the TEA. The answer to this 
question must be in the affirmative. This is because the main criteria of tangibility, 
permanence and readability in the definition of document are fulfilled by a computer 
printout. It can further be argued that since the functional operations of the computer are 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 Nigerian case of Anyaebosi v R T Briscoe Nigeria Ltd [1987] 3 N.W.L.R. 84 (part 59). 
34 ‘ “document” includes books, maps, plans, drawings, photographs and also includes any matter 
expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or by more than one of 
these means, intended to be used or which may be used for the purpose of recording the matter.’ 
35 Bamodu, G. ‘Information Communications Technology and E-Commerce: Challenges and 
Opportunities for the Nigerian Legal System and Judiciary’ 2004 (2) The Journal of Information, Law 
and Technology (JILT). http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law2/elj/jilt/2004_2/bamodu/ . 
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more or less the same as the machines listed in section 3(1) (d) of the TEA, the meaning 
of document can be extended to cover a computer printout. 
 
 As mentioned earlier, computer printout is just one form of the output results of 
computer operations in a hard copy. The other form of output of computer operations is 
what is displayed on the computer screen or monitor. In the community of computer 
scientists this is referred to as soft copy36. To my knowledge there has been no academic 
controversy in legal literature in respect to whether a computer printout amounts to 
document. However it is doubtful whether a soft copy of computer output constitutes a 
document under section 3(1) (d) of the TEA. This is because the criterion of 
‘…recording is reasonably permanent’ may not be fulfilled. As discussed earlier, the 
requirement of record to remain permanent relates also to the tangibility. When a 
computer machine is turned off the soft copy may disappear in certain cases and 
immediately loose its tangibility. Two separate situations must be discussed here, first 
where such a soft copy is available only in the Random Access Memory (RAM) of the 
computer, and secondly, where a soft copy is kept in the hard disk of a computer and 
other storage devices.  
 
The first situation raises the problem as to the permanence of soft copy. Once a 
computer machine is turned off anything and everything in RAM is lost if it is not 
saved. This is because the RAM is normally a working area of a computer used for 
displaying and manipulating data.37 In my view a soft copy in this case remains a 
document so long the computer machine is kept on. However it ceases to be a document 
the moment the computer machine is turned off. The first situation can be compared to a 
destroyed printed hard copy when it no longer has a physical existence hence intangible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 Copy of text stored on the computer and only accessible through the computer, See: 
http://www.computerhope.com/jargon/s/softcopy.htm ; examples of ‘soft copy’ include emails, word 
documents, pdf. Files, etc 
37 RAM from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random_access_memory . 
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The second situation is rather straightforward. When a computer machine is turned off a 
soft copy continues to be held in the machine. This is because it has been saved in 
different storage devices of a computer. Just as a printed copy of a letter can be stored in 
a manual file of the office records so that it can no longer be visible and/or readable 
unless the file is consulted in future, the same applies to soft copy. The soft copy 
disappears temporarily but is not lost, it continues to be held in the computer machine, 
i.e., the hard disk, and/or other storage devises like floppy disk, Universal Serial Bus 
(USB) mass storage device, etc.  The soft copy can later be retrieved on the computer 
monitor and be accessible to human eye. It can thus be argued that the question of 
where and how a soft copy should be stored and kept permanently is irrelevant.  
  
2.3  Classification of Documents
             2.3.1 Public v. Private 
 
The Public v. Private classification of documents is based on the criterion of the 
institution from where a document originates. There are two institutional sources of 
documents for purposes of this classification. The first source of documents is the 
public institution while the second is the private institution. Suffice to mention here that 
a public institution encompasses certain acts or records of state officials and bodies; and 
a private institution covers private individuals and bodies. The documents which reside 
in the domain of the public institution are referred to as public documents and those in 
the private institution are known as private documents. 
 
Phipson on Evidence38 makes the distinction between public and private documents on 
the criteria of modes of proof. The learned author aptly says: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 Howard, M.N, et al(ed) Phipson on Evidence,15th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2000, p. 1071. 
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‘Documents may, for evidential purposes, be roughly classed as 
public, i.e. their usual method of proof being by copy,...and private, 
i.e.  their usual method of proof being by production of the original 
document...’  
 
The criteria of classification of documents by Phipson are not free of doubts. First, 
entries in bankers’ books which are private documents39 are always proved by 
production of copies instead of original. Second, with the development of computer 
technology, computer printouts have been regarded either as original (e.g. US) or copy 
(e.g. Nigeria). In either case, the treatment of computer printouts as original or copy 
may implicate their mode of proof in the contrary way as suggested by the learned 
author. 
 
The TEA does not contain definitions of public nor private document. It only contains a 
list of public documents in section 83 of the Act40. The Act further states in section 84 
that all other documents other than public documents are private documents. 
 
In my view the above classification of documents is apparently not affected by the 
development of the new technologies, particularly the computer. This is because what 
makes a document public or private is not the technology involved in making it but the 
institution it resides. Thus a computer printout constituting the act of the President of 
the United Republic, for example, remains a public document. However the methods of 
proof of these documents have been affected in some ways by the development of 
computer technologies.41
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 Tapper, C, Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 10th Edition, Lexis Nexis, UK, 2004, p.708. 
40See: Section 83. (a) documents forming the acts or records of the acts- (i) of the President of the United 
Republic; (ii) of official bodies and tribunals; and (iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and 
executive; (b) public records kept in the United Republic of private documents. 
41 Further discussion on methods of proof is found in Chapter Four. 
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2.3.2 Original v. Copy 
 
The determination of the original and copy of a document for purposes of the best 
evidence rule is among the most difficult areas of the law of evidence especially in the 
computerized environment. It can be asked: is the distinction between an original and a 
copy a question of logic or context? This is not an easy question to answer as correctly 
observed by one authority:  
 
‘It is not always easy, however, to determine what is the original 
document so as to constitute primary evidence in this sense, and 
sometimes the same document is primary for one purpose and 
secondary for another.’42
 
The presence of computers has created additional complexities and definitional 
problems within the accepted rules of evidentiary procedure.43Gahtan (1999:152)44 
summarizes such complexities in the following paragraph:  
 
‘In the case of computer- produced evidence, it is not always clear 
what is an “original” and what is a “copy”. When information is first 
entered into a computer system, it is commonly stored in the system’s 
memory (for instance, ready/write or RAM memory on a PC, which 
generally has the quickest access time). It is then usually quickly 
copied to a semi-permanent storage device such as a hard disk so that 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 Malek, H. M(ed)( et al), Phipson on Evidence, Sixteenth Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London,2005 p. 
1192. 
43 Rines, R.H and Roster, M.D, Computer Jurisprudence: Legal Responses to Information Revolution 
349(1986), Dobby Ferry, N.Y, Oceana Publications, c 1985. 
44 Gahtan, A.M, Electronic Evidence, Carswell,Canada/U.S,1999.  
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the system’s core memory can be freed up of other tasks. At some 
point it may also be copied or moved to a magnetic tape or optical 
disk storage media for longer term storage. The information, as stored 
in any of the foregoing digital storage mediums, is not perceived by 
humans and must be printed out in hardcopy form, or displayed on a 
computer monitor. Courts have not always been consistent as to when 
a record stops being an “original” and becomes a “copy” during this 
process’. 
 
Just to amplify the last point in italics from the above quote, the USA approach in this 
matter has been to make it specific in the FRE that computer printout is an original 
document.45 The FRE however is the USA Federal statute. In states where the FRE has 
been transposed in their legislations the same approach is applicable. However in states 
where the FRE has not been implemented the common law admits computer printouts 
as copy. The Mississippi case of King v. State for Use and Benefit of Murdock 
Acceptance Corp46 in the USA is an illustrative case to the point. In this case the court 
held: 
  
‘Information stored in the computer constituted the “original”, and the 
printout was the “copy”. The “copy” was admissible as secondary 
evidence as the “original” was unavailable, being in a form which was 
not readable.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 FRE; Rule 1001(3) -states in pertinent part: ‘An “original” of a writing or recording is the writing or 
recording itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it....If 
data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to 
reflect the data accurately, is an “original”’. 
46 222 So.2d 393 (Miss. 1969), noted in 41 Miss.L.J. 604 (1970). 
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The opposite approach was taken by the Nigerian Supreme Court in Anyaebosi v R T 
Briscoe 47 where it was held that a computer printout is a copy. It should be recalled that 
the Nigerian Evidence Act, just like the TEA, does not specifically mention the status of 
computer data vis-à-vis computer printout. 
 
The USA and Nigerian approaches as to the status of computer printout represent the 
main lines of the dichotomy between original and copy of a document in the rules of 
admissibility of documentary evidence. My research of statutory and case law as well as 
legal discussions across the common law countries has revealed four omissions in 
relation to the distinction between original and copy. The first point which has always 
been overlooked by legislators, judges and legal academics is that when a conclusion is 
made to the effect that computer printout is an original document and/or a copy the 
opposite determination is left unattended. For example, while the US FRE categorically 
states that a computer printout is an original, the same piece of legislation is silent on 
the status of computer data. The same trend occurs in the above cited Nigerian case. 
When the Nigerian Supreme Court ruled that a computer printout is a copy it stopped 
there and said nothing about the status of computer data of which the print-out was 
admitted as secondary evidence.  In my view the omission to deliberate on the status of 
computer data in both cases does not necessarily mean that if a computer printout is said 
to be a copy then the former constitutes an original document and vice versa.  If that 
was the case then it could be logically difficult to comprehend the US FRE situation 
where computer printout is held to be an original document. 
 
The second point which has seldom been addressed in most evidence legislation, case 
law and in academic discussions is the status of soft copy available on the computer 
monitor. It has been pointed out earlier in this section that computer operations on the 
data input may result into two types of outputs: the soft copy on the monitor and the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 See: footnote 37  
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printed hard copy. To my understanding soft copy stands in the middle of computer data 
and computer printout. Until it is printed a computer printout remains in the machine as 
either computer data or soft copy available on the monitor.48 It appears to me that there 
are three types of documents which must be considered in the dichotomy of original and 
copy. These are computer data, soft copy, and printout. In reiterating the first point it is 
further argued that when a computer printout is treated as either original or copy relation 
must not necessarily be directed towards computer data as there exists also a soft copy 
on the computer monitor or in storage devices. 
 
The third point which has been overlooked is relevant as far as secondary evidence is 
concerned.49The question which can be asked here is: what is a copy of a computer 
printout? Further to this question it can be asked: what is a copy of a computer printout 
when the former is held to be an original; similarly it can further be asked: what is a 
copy of a computer printout when the former is held to be a copy? These are important 
questions since they trigger the application of the best evidence rule.50 If care is not 
exercised there is always the danger of categorising computer printouts as primary 
evidence or secondary evidence as the case may be. 
 
The TEA provides under section 64 (4) the rule for determining the primary evidence51 
made by one uniform process. According to this provision, where a number of 
documents are all made by one uniform process, as in the case of printing, lithography 
or photography, each is primary evidence of the contents of the rest; but where they are 
all copies of a common original; they are not primary evidence of the contents of the 
original. Then what is meant by uniform process? Are computer printouts made by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48A ‘soft copy’ may also be stored in different storage devices like floppy disk, USB mass storage, etc. 
49 Matters of secondary evidence are dealt with in Chapter Four.  
50 See: Chapter Four. 
51 Also known as the ‘original’ document. 
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uniform process? What are copies of a common original? Are computer printouts copies 
of a common original? 
The phrase uniform process is linked to printing, lithography or photography such that 
documents made by each of these processes are the same in all parts and at all times. 
The question is whether computer machine can be read in the cited provision. The 
Nigerian case of Esso West Africa Inc. v. L. Oladiti52 is relevant to interpret section 
64(4) of the TEA. Section 94(4) of the Nigerian Evidence Act, which was at issue in the 
Esso case is in pari materia53 to the cited provision of the TEA. In this case Aguda J. 
(as he then was) held: 
‘In my view, the processes of “ printing”, “lithography”, and 
“photography” mentioned in this subsection is(sic) not meant to be 
exhaustive of such process but are mentioned only as examples of the 
type of uniform process intended....’.  
 
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the functionalities of the computer machine are 
generically similar to those mentioned in section 64(4) of the TEA. This being the case, 
it can be argued that computer printouts are made of uniform process thus each 
document is held to be original. The first limb of the rule seems to be in line with the 
approach of treating computer printouts as original.54 However problems arise with 
respect to the second limb of the rule that where they are all copies of a common 
original55, they are not primary evidence of the contents of the original. When 
computer printouts are treated as copies as in the case of the Nigerian jurisdiction, 
where is a common original? What is the status of such copies? The questions raised 
here show how it is difficult to apply the TEA in the ICT environment with sensible 
results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 See: footnote 37. 
53 Identical. 
54 See: US FRE. 
55 Common original implies stemming out from the same existing document to multiple copies. 
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The final point overlooked in most evidence legislations of common law countries are 
definitions of the terms original and copy. Although substantial reference has been 
made to these terms there are no attempts to define them. I have been able to find one 
definition of the term copy in the UK CEA.   In terms of section 13 of the Act a copy is 
defined as follows: 
 
‘A copy in relation to a document, means anything onto which 
information recorded in the document has been copied, by whatever 
means and whether directly or indirectly.  
 
Unfortunately, the UK CEA does not contain the definition of an original document. 
The omission to define these terms may bring great uncertainties especially in the 
computerised environment. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
3. Bankers’ Books 
3.1 Introduction 
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Bankers’ books constitute a special category of document. In most common law 
jurisdictions they are governed by special rules different from ordinary documents 
usually contained in a separate chapter/part56 or statute.57  By ordinary documents I 
mean all documents other than bankers’ books. It is therefore prudent to treat them in a 
separate chapter of their own. There is also another reason why bankers’ books should 
be treated in a separate chapter. In Tanzania the landmark case in Trust Bank Tanzania 
Ltd  on the admissibility of electronic evidence was considered in the sphere of bankers’ 
books.58 Thus this Chapter seeks to define bankers’ books and lay down the regime of 
their admissibility under TEA in the context of electronic evidence.  
3.2 What are they? 
 
Bankers’ books comprise a wide range of documents of transactions between a banker 
and his customer. Examples of these documents include ledgers, day books, cash books, 
books of accounts, etc. However not every document that passes between a banker and 
his customer is a bankers’ book. Under the English law bankers’ books exclude copies 
of letters written and sent by the bank to a customer or bundles of cheques and pay -in-
slips.59
 
As mentioned in section 3.1 of this Chapter, the rules governing the admissibility of 
bankers’ books in Tanzania are found in PART IV of CHAPTER III of TEA. This part 
contains seven sections, namely section 76 to 82. Section 76 is an interpretation 
provision for PART IV. Unfortunately this section does not define what is a bankers’ 
book. There are some case law instead which has considered the definition of a bankers’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 In the case of the TEA, Part IV of Chapter III. 
57 See: UK Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, 1879 and the Indian Bankers’ Book Evidence Act, 1891. 
58 When I was writing this thesis such decision was the only authoritative case binding subordinate courts 
to the High Court of Tanzania; there was however no authoritative decision from the Court of Appeal of 
Tanzania-the supreme court. 
59 See: UK cases in Dadson (1983)77 Cr.App.R.91, C.A; Williams v. Williams (1988) Q.B. 161, CA. 
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book in the Tanzanian jurisprudence. The landmark case of Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd 
considered this issue for the first time.  
 
The issue before the court in this case was whether or not a computer printout is a 
bankers’ book under the TEA. In disposing this issue, the Court looked into the English 
law as well as the Court of Appeal of Tanzania in the case of Tanzania Cotton 
Marketing Board v. Cogecot Cotton Company SA60 as this was still a grey area. 
 
The Court was first referred to the definition of bankers’ book found in Sarkar on 
Evidence61 by Counsel for the Defendants. The actual provision of the Indian law is 
section 2(3) of the Bankers’ Book Evidence Act, 189162 which provides that bankers’ 
books include ledgers, day books, cash books, account books and all other books used 
in the ordinary business of a bank. It must be pointed out that this definition was 
amended and replaced by a new section in the year 2000 by the Information Technology 
Act, 200063 which provides:  
 
‘bankers books  include ledgers, day-books, cash-books, account-
books and all other books used in the ordinary business of a bank 
whether kept in the written form or as printouts of data stored in a 
floppy, disc, tape or any other form of electro-magnetic data storage 
device’.64(Emphasis supplied).  
 
Counsel for the defendants did not address this latest development in the Indian 
legislation probably because it would turn against his clients’ interests, was unaware of 
and/or the provision did not exist during this period. His submission was that computer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 (1997) T. L. R 165. 
61 Sarkar on Evidence, 15th Edition, Vol. 2 p.2370. 
62 Act No. 18 of 1891(India). 
63 Act No. 21 of 2000(India), Paragraph 1, Third Schedule. 
64 It is not clear if this provision was already in force at the time of this case. 
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printout is not a bankers’ book as the same was not contemplated in that definition (the 
old definition of bankers’ books in the Indian legislation). The Court did not give its 
opinion on this submission. Instead it inclined to the submission of the Counsel for the 
plaintiff who cited the English law in support.  
The Counsel started by citing section 9 of the UK Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, 1879 
whose definition of bankers’ books is the same as that found in the Indian Bankers’ 
Book Evidence Act, 1891. He went further to note, as the Court did, that the definition 
of bankers’ books under the English law was amended in 1979 by the Banking Act, 
1979. In terms of section 9(2) of this piece of legislation, bankers’ books include: 
 
‘ledgers, day-books, cash books, account-books and other records 
used in the ordinary business of the bank, whether those records are in 
written form or are kept on microfilm, magnetic tape or any other 
form of mechanical or electronic data retrieval mechanism’.  
 
In effect the statutory extension of the definition of the bankers’ books in the English 
Banking Act, 1979 is the same as that of the Indian Information Technology Act, 2000. 
Counsel for the plaintiff further cited the UK case of Barker v. Wilson65 in which 
Bridge, L.J had this to say:  
 
‘The Bankers’ Books Evidence Act 1879 was enacted with the 
practice of bankers in 1879 in mind. It must be construed in 1980 in 
relation to the practice of bankers as we now understand it. So 
construing the definition of “bankers’ books” and the phrase “any 
entry in the banker’s book” it seems to me that clearly both phrases 
are apt to include any form of permanent record kept by the bank of 
transactions relating to the bank’s business, made by any of the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 (1980) 2 All ER 80 at p.82 
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methods which modern technology makes available, including in 
particular, microfilm’. (Emphasis supplied).  
 
Convinced of the approach of the English law Nsekela, J. (as he then was) held that a 
computer printout is a bankers’ book under the TEA. This means equally that the 
definition of a bankers’ book in the Tanzanian jurisprudence extends from the original 
definition of bankers’ books as found in the English law as well as the Indian law which 
included ‘ledgers, day books, cash books, account books’.  
 
The Judge was also convinced that a broad approach of interpretation was appropriate 
and necessary and cited the Court of Appeal of Tanzania’s judgment in Tanzania Cotton 
Marketing Board to support his opinion.  
 
The strong persuasive force of the English law as to the definition of a bankers’ book 
under the TEA clearly suggests that what is not a bankers’ book in the former will 
likewise be excluded in the later. As mentioned above, copies of letters written and sent 
by the bank to a customer or bundles of cheques and pay-in-slips are not considered as 
bankers’ books under the English law.66. If this question arise in future in our courts, it 
is most likely that the courts will follow the principles under English law. 
 
One legal commentator67 has criticized the Court’s reliance on the English law on its 
interpretation of the term bankers’ book while the reception clause is no longer 
available under our legal system to automatically adopt the English law. The former 
constituted the legal basis for the application of the English law (the common law, the 
doctrines of equity and statutes of general application in England)68 in Tanganyika (now 
called Tanzania after independence in 1961). In the opinion of the learned author if a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 See: footnote 63. 
67 See: footnote 11. 
68 See: Section 17(2) of the Tanganyika Order-in-Council, 1920. 
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similar case find itself in the Court of Appeal, Tanzania’s highest court, it is possible 
that the Court of Appeal may reach a different decision. It appears in my view that the 
author’s conception of reception clause is misconstrued in this specific context.  First, 
the reception clause as provided in section 17(2) of the Tanganyika Order-in-Council, 
1920 (hereinafter the TOC) introduced in Tanganyika for the first time the application 
of the English law.69 This was a result of the German defeat in World War I and the 
transfer of the German East Africa (Tanganyika)70 to the British71.The TOC was later 
repealed after independence in 1961 by the Judicature and Application of Laws 
Ordinance, 196172 (hereinafter the JALO). Section 2(2) of the JALO retained the 
application of the English law in Tanganyika (now Tanzania) in a limited scale. The 
conditions for the application of the English law are mainly three. The first condition is 
that there is no statute and/or provision enacted by the Tanzanian Parliament to govern a 
particular matter.73 The second condition is that the said English law must have been in 
force in Britain on the reception date, i.e., 22nd July, 1920. The third condition is that 
such law is subject to modification by the court to suit local circumstances. Thus it is 
inconceivable to argue that the Tanzanian case of Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd was decided 
on the basis of the reception clause while pointing out a post-reception date English 
statute74 and case law.75  
 
It can further be argued that beyond the conditions stipulated in section 2(2) of the 
JALO the English law has persuasive force in Tanzania. This persuasive force of the 
English law has its legal basis from the common law legal system inherited by all most 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 The English law referred here was restricted to the law in force in Britain on the reception date, i.e., 
22nd July, 1920. Subsequent development of the English law after this date had no force of law in 
Tanganyika.  
70 German East Africa comprised of Rwanda, Burundi and Tanganyika. After World War I Tanganyika 
was put under the mandate of the British by virtue of the League of Nations. 
71 See: Articles 118 & 119 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles, 1919. 
72 Cap. 453 of the Laws of Tanzania. 
73 A good example is the application of the common law doctrine of intention to create legal relation in 
contract formation which is not provided in the Tanzanian Law of Contract Ordinance,1961. 
74 English Banking Act, 1979. 
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African countries formerly under the British colonial rule. Nguluma (1979: 192)76 
correctly observes: 
 
‘We have seen that the Indian Evidence Act is little more than an 
attempt to reduce the English law of evidence to the form of express 
propositions, with only few modifications rendered necessary by the 
peculiar circumstances of India. The said Act, having worked 
successfully in the British India colony, was directly introduced in the 
East African countries, that is, Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar and 
Tanganyika, late in the nineteenth century and early in the twentieth 
century, respectively...’. 
 
Thus my view is that by making reference to the UK law the High Court of Tanzania 
was not falling to the defunct reception clause. It was rather looking around to other 
common law jurisdictions to see how the provisions of the TEA would be interpreted in 
the context of new technologies. This is not a new approach in the common law legal 
tradition. It is more akin to statute in pari materia approach, though in this particular 
situation the TEA does not contain a definition of bankers’ books at all. Arguably, the 
Court was not bound to follow the interpretation of the English law, it was merely 
persuaded. 
 
Finally, it should also be noted that Nsekela J. cited also the Court of Appeal of 
Tanzania’s case of Tanzania Marketing Board where at pages 4 to 5 he noted: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 See: footnote 75. 
76 Nguluma, A.T, ‘The Tanzania Law of Evidence in Historical Socio-Economic Context,’ A Dissertation 
Submitted for the Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Master of Laws(LL.M) Degree of the 
University of Dar es salaam, 1979. 
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 ‘...But in taking this course of action, I am certainly not traversing 
virgin territory. The highest court of the land in the case of Tanzania 
Cotton Marketing Board v. Cogecot Cotton Company SA (1997) 
TLR 165 had occasion to construe the words “registered post” 
appearing in Rule 4 of the Arbitration Rules, 1957…’ (Emphasis 
original) 
 
By the words ‘...But in taking this course of action, I am certainly not traversing virgin 
territory’ the Judge supposedly was referring to the broad interpretation in the Court of 
Appeal’s case. It is submitted that the Court of Appeal would most likely uphold the 
High Court position if the matter was appealed against. 
 
 
 
3.3 Rules of Admissibility 
 
The main rule of admissibility of a bankers’ book is contained in section 77 of the 
TEA.77According to this provision a bankers’ book is always admitted in court as copy. 
Section 78 of this Act lies down three criteria which must be fulfilled before a copy of 
an entry of a bankers’ book is admitted as evidence78. These include first, that the book 
must be one of the ordinary books of the bank, second, that the entry must have been 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
77Section 77 provides that subject to this Act, a copy of any entry in a banker’s book shall in all legal 
proceedings be received as prima facie evidence of such entry and of the matters, transactions and 
accounts therein recorded. 
78 Section 78 (l) provides that a copy of an entry in a banker's book shall not be received in evidence 
under this Act unless it be first proved that the book was at the time of the making of the entry one of the 
ordinary books of the bank, and that the entry was made in the usual and ordinary course of business, and 
that the book is in the custody or control of the bank.(2) Such proof may be given by a partner or officer 
of the bank, and may be given orally or by an affidavit sworn before any commissioner for oaths or 
person authorized to take affidavits. 
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made in the ordinary course of business and finally that  the book must be in custody or 
control of the bank. This section provides further two categories of persons who may 
give evidence for the bank and the manner such evidence should be given. It is specified 
in this section that a partner or officer of the bank may give proof of a bankers’ book. 
This proof may be given orally or by an affidavit sworn before any commissioner for 
oaths or person authorized to take affidavits. 
 
What is meant by the following phrases: ordinary books of the bank? in the first 
criterion; in the ordinary course of business in the second criterion? and custody or 
control of the bank in the third criterion? Unfortunately there is no guidance in the TEA 
and case law as to the meaning of these phrases. In the author’s view the phrase 
ordinary books of the bank has direct bearing to the definition of bankers’ book. The 
contrary view will mean that the former and the later are different sort of books 
maintained by the banker hence a situation of absurdity. The phrase in the ordinary 
course of business in the second criterion must be assessed within the practice of 
banking business across the bankers’ community. It should not be limited to what a 
particular bank is doing its business. The last phrase custody or control of the bank is 
also problematic. Both custody and control in this context may mean within the 
jurisdiction of the bank. Thus it is difficult to envisage a situation where a bank has 
custody without control and vice versa.  
 
There is an additional requirement in section 79 of the TEA to be fulfilled over and 
above the requirements in section 78. If this requirement is not met a copy of an entry in 
a bankers’ book will not be received in evidence. For ease of reference this section of 
the law is reproduced verbatim:  
 
‘79.-(1) A copy of an entry in a banker's book shall not be received in 
evidence under this Act unless it be further proved that the copy has 
been examined with the original entry and is correct. (2) Such proof 
shall be given by some person who, has examined the copy with the 
original entry, and may be given either orally or by an affidavit sworn 
before any commissioner for oaths or person authorized to take 
affidavits’ (Emphasis supplied) 
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The marginal notice to this section reads verification of copy. Thus simply stated, a 
copy of an entry in a bankers’ book must also be verified. The verification is made 
through an examination of the copy with the original entry. The dichotomy of copy and 
original entry in the context of computerised environment brings the same problems 
considered in section 2.3.2 of Chapter Two. What is the original entry and what is the 
copy? It is unfortunate that the case of Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd did not direct itself to 
this point. The learned judge simply held: 
 
‘It is in this spirit that I am prepared to extend the definition of 
bankers’ books to include evidence emanating from computers subject 
of course to the same safeguards applicable to other bankers’ books 
under sections 78 and 79 of the Evidence Act.’’79.(Emphasis 
supplied). 
 
In my view, reference to the original entry should be related to the raw data before 
keyed in the computer machine via the keyboard. This is because the computer data are 
intangible being in the form of binary code. Thus the concept of original in this context 
should not be confined to the computer data but to the original raw data. 
  
There is another problem emerging from section 79(2) of the TEA. This provision 
provides further that proof shall be given by some person.  The phrase some person is 
not clear. Are the categories of persons referred in section 78(2) of the TEA namely a 
partner or officer of the bank different from some person in section 79(2)? It can be 
argued that these are the same persons. This is because it could be difficult to bring a 
witness outside the bank for purposes of verification who is conversant with specific 
transactions and records of the bank. The categories of persons mentioned in section 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 At p. 4 of the High Court of Tanzania (Commercial Division) ruling. 
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78(2) are better placed in the business of the bank and most probably the authors of 
such entries in the bankers’ book.   
 
To conclude this Chapter, while I applaud the conclusion of the Court in the case of 
Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd I argue that the judgement falls short of clarification of a 
number of issues. Firstly, the learned judge, Nsekela (as he then was) dealt with the 
issue of whether a computer printout is a bankers’ book under the TEA rather very 
briefly. The judge endorsed the English law without deep consideration of the import of 
the concerned provisions. For example, the judgment fails to make a distinction 
between copy and original entry in section 79 of the TEA. Again it fails to make 
specific discussion on how the traditional safeguards in sections 78 and 79 will apply to 
evidence emanating from computers. Second, the judge did not discuss what amounts to 
an entry in a banker’s book and specifically whether a bank’s computer records, not the 
printout, could amount to a banker’s book for the purposes of the relevant provisions80. 
The judge seemed to have assumed that a bank’s computer records could not amount to 
a banker’s book81.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 See: footnote 39.. 
81 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. Admissibility of Computer Printouts at Trial 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The admissibility of documentary evidence under common law jurisdictions is always 
subject to the requirements imposed by the three rules: best evidence rule, hearsay and 
authentication. The application of these rules is triggered the moment proof of contents 
of a document is sought by a party. These common law rules were developed in Britain 
and were imported to Tanzania in the 1920s via India when Tanganyika (now Tanzania) 
was officially put under the British colonial rule. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was 
the vehicle of this importation. In 1967 when the TEA was enacted, these rules were 
retained although the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ceased to have force of law in 
Tanzania. In this Chapter I examine how the provisions of the TEA embracing the 
above common law rules can be applied to admit electronic evidence (see: section 4.2). 
In particular, this Chapter seeks to know if the admissibility of a computer printout as a 
bankers’ book in the case of Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd can be applied to a class of 
ordinary documents(see: Chapter Three).This Chapter excludes discussion on situations 
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of proof without evidence.82These include formal admissions, judicial notice and 
presumptions. 
 
 
 
 
4.2 An Overview of Rules of Admissibility of Documentary Evidence 
4.2. 1The Best Evidence Rule 
 
4.2.1.1 The Rule 
 
The best evidence rule requires that an original document be produced whenever the 
contents of a private document are sought to be relied by a party to a case. In some 
common law jurisdictions the rule is referred to as the original writing rule83 while in 
others it is called the primary evidence.84 The later is defined in section 64(1) of the 
TEA as the document itself produced for the inspection of the court. The document itself 
is the original as opposed to the copy. In situations where copies are allowed in 
evidence, these are referred to as secondary evidence in section 67 of the TEA. The best 
evidence rule is contained in section 66(1) of the TEA. According to this provision 
documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases hereinafter 
mentioned. The exceptions referred here are those covered by secondary evidence in 
section 67 of the TEA as well as the bankers’ books85. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 Murphy, op cit, pp. 602-621. 
83 US FRE. 
84 See: the TEA. 
85 See:  Chapter Three. 
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There are two main criteria for the best evidence rule to apply. The first criterion is that 
the contents of the document are at issue, and the second criterion is that the document 
to be relied must be a private document as opposed to a public document.86 The later 
category of document is always proved by secondary evidence under section 67(1) (e) 
of the TEA. This provision provides that secondary evidence may be given when the 
original is a public document within the meaning of section 83. 
 
The rationale for the application of the best evidence rule is to give effect to the terms of 
the document with as much accuracy and certainty as possible.87This was a necessary 
rule in the 18th century when the methods of making copies were imperfect, involving 
largely manual copying.88 Thus to avoid the risks of forgeries, mistakes and inaccuracy 
associated with manual copying, or a witness giving oral evidence of the contents of a 
document from memory it was necessary that only original documents should be 
admitted.89 With modern developments in technologies some legal academics like 
Gahtan (1999:151), Dennis (2002:408) and Murphy (2005:584)90  have argued that the 
rationale behind the best evidence rule is no longer valid. 
It is submitted that the technological revolution claimed to have been capable of 
producing perfect copies have never completely prevented forgeries, mistakes and 
inaccuracy. The mechanical/electronic processes of the computer are still under the 
threat of hackers who can interfere with the system with the intention to defraud. 
Software is also not always perfect. There are cases of computer virus which corrupts 
documents and/or produce some errors in the functioning of software. Additionally, the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 See: section 2.3.1. 
87 Murphy, op cit, p. 584. 
88 California Law Revision Commission , The Best Evidence Rule, November 1996, p. 373. 
89 Dennis, op cit, p. 408. 
90 They argue that the best evidence rule has diminished in importance today, not surprisingly since 
copies can now be made accurately and inexpensively, through electronic means such as photocopiers. 
These generally remove any potential for error or inaccuracy in the copy. In the case of digital works 
(such as data in a computer system or stored on computer-readable media), the copies can be an exact 
duplicate of the original. 
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new technologies have not completely replaced handwritten documents. Even in the 
cyberspace there are still as many handwritten documents as computer printouts in both 
public and private businesses. Thus with these concerns the best evidence rule can not 
be thrown away notwithstanding the prevalence of the new technologies and their 
alleged perfection. 
 
 
 
4.2.1.2 Computer Printouts and the Best Evidence Rule 
 
It has been pointed out earlier that the best evidence rule is reflected in section 66 of the 
TEA. The question is: how should this rule be applied in admitting computer printouts 
in courts? In other words, can the decision of Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd in which the 
High Court of Tanzania (Commercial Division) admitted computer printout as a 
bankers’ book be applied with regard to the ordinary documents? 
 
To answer the above questions we must consider in the first place whether a computer 
printout is a document. Then whether such a document is a public or private, and finally 
whether it is an original or copy. These three questions have already been addressed in 
detail in sections 2.2 and 2.3. 
 
The case of Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd was not concerned with the above questions. As 
mentioned, the main issue in that case was whether a computer printout is a bankers’ 
book as opposed to whether a computer printout is a document. It is submitted that 
despite the variation of the two issues, the Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd case is relevant to 
confirm that a computer printout is a document. Bankers’ books are only a special class 
of documents regulated with special rules. The mere fact that they are regulated by 
special rules does not exclude them from the general definition of document under 
section 3(1) (d) of the TEA. For all purposes and intents bankers’ books are documents 
in the first place. They have only acquired a special name because they regulate the 
relationship between a banker and his customer. And for practical reasons, they have 
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been excluded from the general rules of documentary evidence with regard to the 
ordinary documents. 
It can further be argued that bankers’ books are only an exception to the best evidence 
rule. This can be gathered from the wordings of section 66(1) of the TEA. Just to recall 
what this section provides, I reproduce it below: 
 
‘Documents must be proved by primary evidence except in the cases 
hereinafter mentioned’. (Emphasis supplied) 
 
As it has already been mentioned above the phrase except in the cases hereinafter 
mentioned covers the secondary evidence where a copy is adduced in evidence. Now 
since sections 67 and 77 on proof of secondary evidence and bankers’ book respectively 
come subsequently to section 66(1) in the arrangement of sections of the TEA, they are 
both envisaged in this phrase. It is further argued that in both cases the mode of proof is 
by adducing copies and not original documents.  
 
The second consideration is whether a document is public or private. The best evidence 
rule requires that whenever the contents of a private document are sought to be proved 
an original document should be produced. The case of Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd is less 
helpful in this aspect. This is because bankers’ books are private documents and so in 
theory they should be proved by primary evidence91, i.e., the production of the original 
document. Because of the obvious inconvenience of the rule to the banks, whose 
records of customers’ accounts are often required in litigation, special provisions were 
enacted to regulate evidence of the bankers’ books.92 By section 77 of the TEA:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 Tapper, op cit, p.708, See also: Murphy (supra) p. 590. 
 
92 Ibid. 
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‘Subject to this Act, a copy of any entry in a banker’s book shall in all 
legal proceedings be received as prima facie evidence of such entry 
and of the matters, transactions and accounts therein 
recorded’.(Emphasis supplied) 
 
It is this rule which as a point of departure excludes bankers’ books from the general 
application of the best evidence rule. Thus the absolute rule becomes that bankers’ 
books are proved by secondary evidence regardless of their being private documents. 
But unlike the secondary evidence referred in section 67 of the TEA, bankers’ books are 
further subjected to more strict safeguards in sections 78 and 79 of the TEA. (See: 
section 3.3). 
The last consideration is whether a computer printout is original or copy. There is no 
case law in Tanzanian jurisprudence which has considered this question. It is very 
unfortunate that the learned judge in the case of Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd did not 
address this issue. As mentioned earlier, before a bankers’ book is admitted in evidence 
an examination of a copy and an original entry must be carried out as required under 
section 79 of the TEA.(See: section3.3). Thus the provisions de lege lata are far from 
being settled in respect to electronic evidence.  
 
4.2.2 The Rule against Hearsay 
 
4.2.2.1 The Rule 
 
Hearsay is one of the most complex and confusing of the exclusionary rules of 
evidence.93Commenting on the complexity and confusion of the rule Lord Reid 
remarked it is difficult to make a general statement about the law of hearsay which is 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 Tapper, C. Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 10th Edition, Lexis Nexis, United Kingdom, 2004, p.577 
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entirely accurate.94However despite these hurdles many formulations in the academic 
circles and case law exist to define the rule. It is not possible in a short thesis like this to 
underscore all these formulations. In the following, this thesis adopts the definition used 
in Cross on Evidence as cited with approval by the House of Lords95 in the cases of  R 
v. Sharp96 and R v. Kearly.97 The rule is formulated in the following words: 
 
‘An assertion other than one made by a person while giving oral 
evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of any fact 
asserted.’(Emphasis supplied) 
 
The language used in this formulation is highly technical. To put it simple, the rule 
restricts a witness while in a witness box to repeat what a third party had said outside 
the courtroom as a matter of its truth. The parameters of the rule were made in the UK 
case of Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor98. In this case the Privy Council held that 
evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called as a 
witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of 
the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not 
hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth 
of the statement, but the fact that it was made.  
 
Thus it is the purpose and/or object which defines whether a particular statement 
amounts to hearsay or not. The operational words are truth and fact of the statement. If 
a statement is tendered to the court for purpose of proving its truth it is hearsay and 
generally inadmissible unless if falls within a recognised exception to the hearsay 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94 Myres v. DPP(1965) A.C. 1001, 1019, HL. 
95 English Supreme Court. 
96 (1988) 1 W.L.R. 7, HL. 
97 (1992) 2 A.C 228, 254. 
98 (1956) W.L.R. 965. 
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rule.99 However if the purpose is only to establish the fact of the statement it is not 
hearsay and is admissible.100 In this later case the statement is admissible as real 
evidence.101
In the UK case of re Levin102 where the argument for the appellant was that the 
computer print-outs were inadmissible because they were hearsay in criminal 
proceedings, Lord Hoffmann opined: 
 
‘This argument seems to me wrong at every stage. First, the print-outs 
are not hearsay....The hearsay rule, as formulated in Cross & Tapper 
on Evidence, 8th ed. (1995), p. 46, states that "an assertion other than 
one made by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings is 
inadmissible as evidence of any fact asserted." The print-outs are 
tendered to prove the transfers of funds which they record. They do 
not assert that such transfers took place. They record the transfers 
themselves, created by the interaction between whoever purported to 
request the transfers and the computer programme in Parsipanny. The 
evidential status of the print-outs is no different from that of a 
photocopy of a forged cheque.’ (Emphasis supplied) 
 
 
The rationale for the rule against hearsay was stated in the UK case of  Teper v. R103 by 
Lord Normand. It was said in this case that hearsay evidence is inadmissible because it 
is not the best evidence and it is not delivered on oath. The truthfulness and accuracy of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 Malek, op cit, p. 789. 
100 Gahtan, op cit, p. 140. 
101 Real evidence as opposed to documentary, testimonial and circumstantial evidence, takes the form of 
material object (including computer output) tendered to the court so that an inference may be drawn from 
its observation as to the existence, condition or value of the object in question. See Gahtan, p. 149. 
102http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldjudgmt/jd970619/levin.htm. 
 
103 (1952) A.C. 480, 486. 
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the person whose words are spoken to by another witness cannot be tested by cross 
examination and the light which his demeanour would throw on his testimony is lost. 
 
In Tanzania the rule against hearsay is reflected in PART IV of CHAPTER II of the 
TEA. Of particular relevance to this thesis are sections 34B and 34C which deal with 
proof of written statements in criminal and civil proceedings respectively. Since 
computer printouts are usually admitted as real evidence as we shall see in the next 
section then these provisions will not be discussed in details. 
 
 
4.2.2.2 Computer Printouts and the Rule against Hearsay  
 
Modern technology has provided means of storing, interpreting and reproducing data in 
ways which lead to inherently probative evidence being available to the courts.104The 
question is how should the common law rule against hearsay be applied to regulate the 
new phenomena, especially computer printouts? This is a difficult question since there 
is neither statutory provision nor case law in Tanzania which has dealt with this issue 
before. The difficulty is exacerbated by the nature of the production of computer 
printouts themselves. Explaining this phenomenon Gregory and Tollefson (1995) put:  
 
‘The exclusionary effects of the hearsay rule can make some matters 
of proof extremely difficult, especially with electronic evidence, 
where computer data is often not entered by a person with personal 
knowledge of the matters. Also, the person presenting the information 
contained in electronic documents as evidence in court will usually 
not have personal knowledge of that information.’105  
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 Malek, op cit, p. 789. 
105 Tollefson, E and Gregory, J.D, ‘Proposals for a Uniform Evidence Act’, Uniform Law Conference of 
Canada, 1995 at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/poam2/index.cfm?sec=1995&sub=1995ad.  
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From the above quote it appears that the concern of Gregory and Tollefson is rested on 
lack of knowledge of the matter between a person who enters the data in the computer 
and the one who presents the information as evidence in court. There is however 
another concern by Keller and Murray (1997)106. The co-authors’ concern is about 
authorship. They have observed that the difficulty with computer records is how to 
show who the author actually is or even how many authors created a document. It is 
further observed by the learned authors that as many computer records are now held on 
computer networks, the documents may have hundreds of potential authors.   
 
The above concerns have led computer printouts to be treated in some common law 
jurisdictions as hearsay statement and only admissible under the business records 
exception107. The USA jurisdiction is a direct example to the point. Under Rule 803(6) 
of the US FRE the term business includes business, institution, association, profession, 
occupation, and calling of any kind, whether or not conducted for profit.  
 
This provision excludes individuals outside the business circles to invoke its 
application. For instance, when two individuals exchange e-mails outside the business 
circles it is most likely the printouts of such e-mails will not qualify under the business 
record exception. Since in the US computer printouts are only admissible under the 
business record exception it can be argued that the approach is inadequate.  
 
In the UK and some other common law jurisdictions the common law approach of 
admissibility of mechanically produced documents has been invoked to computer 
printouts as well. This however depends on whether a printout is derived from 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 Keller, D. And Murray, K. Information Technology Law in Ireland, Butterworths, Dublin, 1997, p. 
353. 
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information fed into the machine by a person, the so called human generated electronic 
evidence or the printout was created without the intervention of a human mind, the so 
called computer-generated evidence.108 The former involves hearsay and is 
inadmissible while the latter real evidence and admissible. Illustrative of these two 
situations is the English case of R v. Spiby109 in which the printout was from a hotel’s 
computerised machine called a ‘Norex’. This machine monitored guests’ telephone 
calls, recording them and working out charges.110The printout of this record was 
admitted as real evidence. Taylor LJ held: 
 
‘This was not a printout which depended in its content for anything 
that had passed through the human mind. All that had happened was 
that when someone in one of the rooms in the hotel had lifted the 
receiver from the telephone and, with his finger, pressed certain 
buttons, the machine had made a record of what was done and printed 
out. The situation would have been quite different if a telephone 
operator in the hotel had had herself to gather the information, then 
type it into a computer bank, and there came then a print-out from the 
computer. There the human mind would have been involved, that 
would have been hearsay…’ (Emphasis supplied) 
 
It has been pointed out earlier that the common law approach of admissibility of 
mechanically produced documents like computer printouts is not reflected in the 
provisions of the TEA. The reason is that when the TEA was enacted such technology 
was not available in the country. Thus when a question of admissibility of computer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107 R.King and C. Stanley, Ensuring the Court Admissibility of Computer-Generated Records, 
Proceedings of the IEEE 1st International Conference on Office Automation (New Orleans, La., Dec. 17-
19) IEEE, New York, 1984. 
108 Tapper, op cit, p. 373 & Phipson, op cit, p.789 
109 (1990) 91 Cr App R 186, CA. 
110 Taylor, A, Principles of Evidence,2nd Edition, Cavendish Publishing Ltd, London,2000 p. 173. 
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printout arises consideration of the UK and other common law jurisdictions with the 
same approach may be relevant to the Tanzanian courts. 
 
4.2.3 The Authentication Rule 
 
4.2.3. 1 The Rule 
 
Authentication means satisfying the court (a) that the contents of the record have 
remained unchanged, (b) that the information in the record does in fact originate from 
its purported source, whether human or machine, and (c) that extraneous information 
such as the apparent date of the record is accurate. Reed (1990)111    
 
Reed’s definition points out three important elements of authentication namely: 
unchangeability, origination and accuracy of contents of a document. In some legal 
literature the authenticity is termed as ‘integrity’ of a document’.112 The latter relates to 
the ability to verify that the content of a document had not been changed since it was 
written, finished and adopted by the author. The term ‘integrity’ is however more 
commonly used in communication of electronic documents in electronic commerce law 
than in evidence. Authentication can further be contrasted with information security. 
The former’s primary function is to identify the author and accuracy of a document 
while the latter’s primary function is the protection of information against unauthorised 
access, modification, destruction or disclosure. It can be argued that as an aspect of 
authentication accuracy may encompass some of the information security issues like 
modification. However authentication and information security are two different 
concepts and serve different functions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
111 Reed, C. The Admissibility and Authentication of Computer Evidence- A Confusion of Issues, 5th 
BILETA Conference British and Irish Legal Technology Association, p. 5.  
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The main rule with regard to authentication at common law is that a document or other 
thing must be introduced to the court by a human being whose task it is to explain its 
identity, its nature, its provenance and its relevance.113 This rule stems out the maxim 
that a document or other thing cannot authenticate itself at common law.114
 
No particular mode of proof of authentication of a document at common law is required. 
Since authentication is a question of fact and not law, it may be proved through direct 
evidence (i.e. oral) or circumstantial evidence115.Modern technologies have also made it 
possible for authentication to be proved via technological features of the system or 
record.116 It must be emphasised that the common law rule of authentication is premised 
on the assumption that any documentary evidence will exist on paper and authentication 
lies in the testimony of the document’s author or in verification of signature.117
 
The common law rule of authentication is reflected in section 69 of the TEA. This 
section provides: 
 
‘If a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly 
or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much 
of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting must 
be proved to be in his handwriting’(Emphasis supplied) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 Lim, Y.F, Cyberspace Law: Commentaries and Materials, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 
2002, p. 220. 
113 Tapper, op cit, p. 369. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Angel J. and Reed C, Computer Law,4th Edition, Blackstone Press Ltd, London, 2000, p. 308. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Bender, D, ‘Computer Evidence Law: Scope and Structure’, Vol. 1, Computer Law Journal, 
699,714(1979). 
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The above section makes reference to two important concepts: signature and 
handwriting. The latter term is clear but less obvious in meaning is the former term. The 
TEA does not define what is a signature and which form it should take. However 
commenting on the principle and scope of section 67 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 
which is in pari materia with section 69 of the TEA, Sarker118 points out: 
 
‘This section refers to documents other than documents required by 
law to be attested. It says that the signature of the person alleged to 
have signed a document (i.e. execution) must be proved by evidence 
that the signature purporting to be that of the executant is in his 
handwriting (see Venkatachala v. Thimmajamma, A 1959 SC 443 
post) and the other matter is the document (i.e. its body) must also be 
proved by proof of handwriting of the person or persons purporting to 
have written the document. Execution is proved by the first (i.e. proof 
of signature) and the genuineness of the document is proved by the 
second (i.e. proof of handwriting, unless they are admitted by the 
other side’. (Emphasis supplied) 
 
The above commentary does not also define what is a signature. It provides however its 
form i.e. manuscript. In an Indian case of Gangadhar Das v. Gadadhar Das119 it was 
further held that the execution of a document can not be said to be invalid merely 
because a person who knows to sign his name executes a document by putting his 
thumb impression. Thus under section 69 of the TEA proof of signature is by 
handwriting of a person who signed a document and proof of the genuineness of a 
document is through handwriting of its author. Proof of signature must also comply 
with sections 47 and 49 of the TEA. The two provisions relate to proof by experts and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118  Manohar V.R and Sarkar, S. Sarkar on Evidence, 14th Edition, Vol. 1, Wadhawa & Co. Nagpur, India. 
119 A 1986 Orissa, 173, 181. 
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non-experts respectively. How far can the traditional rule of authentication be applied in 
the electronic environment? This question is taken up in the next section. 
 
4.2.3.2 Computer Printouts and Authentication 
 
Like the best evidence rule and hearsay, authentication of computer printouts creates 
many problems. In many cases the evidence is produced from the custody of a party to 
the proceedings, who will have an interest to serve and may have an inducement to 
tamper with the evidence.120 To make matters worse any alteration will have taken 
place not on the thing produced in court, but on the storage medium from which it has 
been derived.121Besides the malicious activities of the parties to the proceedings, there 
are other problems relating to the system itself and security. These include system 
failures, software problems, and danger of unauthorized access to the file through other 
terminals in the network or by hackers122
 
So far there is no Tanzanian case which has directly addressed the problem of 
authentication of evidence derived from the computer. The case of Trust Bank Tanzania 
Ltd addressed the problem of authenticity of computer printouts within the traditional 
safeguards governing the admissibility of a bankers’ book. (See section 3.3). The 
judgment does not offer a deep discussion of authentication of computer printout. It 
simply subjects bankers’ books to the provisions of sections 78 and 79 of the TEA. It 
should be recalled however that bankers’ books are governed by special provisions, and 
they are generally outside the scope of section 69 of the TEA which regulates 
authentication of ordinary documents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 Tapper, op cit, p.369. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Gahtan, op cit, p.158. 
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In other common law jurisdictions like the USA for example, where computer printouts 
are admitted in evidence as business records no special foundation for qualifying 
computer printouts is needed.123 The USA courts admit business records on a 
presumption that the systems producing such records yield accurate results. The  
rationale for the presumption of reliability of computer records arise from the fact that if 
businesses rely on the records in the ordinary course of their affairs, then the means by 
which businesses process and record the data under their control is accurate.124This 
approach is criticised by Peritz who argue that courts are too lax with computer records 
but seemed to be realistic by Wright.125It may be argued that the threshold level for 
foundation evidence in the USA when admitting computer records is too minimal. The 
UK has recently followed the USA approach. The CEA provides in its section 9: 
 
‘Any document taken from a business record is to be admitted as 
evidence’.  
 
This approach appears to remove unnecessary burden in proving authentication of 
computer printouts. In these jurisdictions also both expert and non-expert are allowed to 
demonstrate a minimum level the operation of computer system. 
 
It must be noted that in the area of electronic commerce digital signatures are widely 
used in authenticating electronic contracts. This however has been the result of 
harmonisation of national laws in specific regions like European Union.126These are 
accepted in admissibility of electronic evidence. So far Tanzania has no specific 
 
 
 
 
 
 
123 See: footnote 16. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Wright, B. The Law of Electronic Commerce EDI, Fax, and E-mail: Technology, Proof, and Liability, 
Little Brown and Co, London, 1991, p. 119. 
126 Directive 119/93/EC. 
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legislation to govern electronic contracts; hence the legal status of digital signatures is 
unknown. 
 
4.3 Modern Technology and the Interpretation of Older Statutes: The Age of       
      Liberal Approach                    
  
Recent development in technologies, particularly the computer, has strained the 
traditional methods of statutory interpretation. This is partly because of the rise of new 
concepts associated with the new technologies previously unforeseen by the older 
statutes. There is another reason; the fact that these statutes were enacted in a different 
social and technological context from the present limit their interpretation in the light of 
the earlier object and purpose. 
 
In a jurisdiction like Tanzania where most statues have not been brought in line with the 
new technologies, courts are left with the task of developing the law through case law. 
This implies also that the courts have to find suitable interpretation of the older statues 
in the new context. This is not an easy task considering the fact that technical issues 
relating to the new technologies are involved in most cases.  In the previous sections of 
this thesis we have seen how difficult it is to interpret some concepts like document, 
original, copy, etc. We have seen also some difficulties in applying the common law 
rules of admissibility of documentary evidence to computer printouts.  
 
The case law concerning the interpretation of the TEA in the light of modern 
technologies is rather small and to my knowledge the problem has not been treated 
directly in the landmark case of Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd. However in the two cases of 
Tanzania Cotton Marketing Board v. Cogecot Cotton Company SA127  and Trust Bank 
Tanzania Ltd the Court of Appeal of Tanzania and the High Court of Tanzania 
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(Commercial Division) respectively have been prepared to invoke the principle of 
updated construction to interpretation of older statutes. This approach is liberal in the 
sense that it flexibly interprets older statutes to accommodate changing circumstances. 
 
In the case of Tanzania Cotton Marketing Board the Court was faced with question of 
whether the words registered post appearing in Rule 4 of the Tanzania Arbitration Rules 
of 1957 included DHL courier. The Court answered this question affirmatively. It said 
the words  registered post had to be interpreted widely enough in order to take into 
account the current development in communication technology, such as courier postal 
services, that had taken place since 1957 when the rules were enacted.  
 
The High Court of Tanzania (Commercial Division) followed the same line of 
reasoning in Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd. As already noted, in this case the issue was 
whether or not a computer printout is a banker’s book under the TEA. The Court 
answered this question in the affirmative. The reasoning of the Court is found in 
pertinent part at page 4 of the ruling where it held: 
 
‘...Tanzania is not an island by itself. The country must move fast to 
integrate itself with the global banking community in terms of 
technological changes and the manner in which banking business is 
being conducted. The courts have to take due cognizance of the 
technological revolution that has engulfed the world. Generally 
speaking as of now, record keeping in our banks is to a large extent 
“old fashioned” but changes are taking place. The law can ill afford to 
shut its eyes to what is happening around the world in the banking 
fraternity.’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
127 T. L. R. 165 
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In arriving at this interpretation the Court also cited the earlier case of the Court of 
Appeal of Tanzania in Tanzania Cotton Marketing Board. This is the same trend of 
judicial practice across the common law jurisdiction in this field of law even in the 
absence of a specific provision of the law. The Canadian case of Tecoglas Inc. v. 
Domglas Inc.128 and the UK case of R v. Minors129 are illustrative of this trend. In the 
Tecoglas Inc the court held that there are not many large enterprises operating 
successfully today who do not use computers in connection to record-keeping. It would 
be almost impossible and certainly impractical to prove expenditures of the nature of 
those in this case without admitting the computer records or documents based on the 
computer print-out. In the case of Minors, the UK Court of Appeal noted:  
 
‘The law of evidence must be adapted to the contemporary business 
practice. Mainframe computers, minicomputers and microcomputers 
play a pervasive role in our society. Often the only record of a 
transaction, which nobody can be expected to remember, will be in the 
memory of a computer. The versatility, power and frequency of use of 
computers will increase. If computer output cannot relatively readily 
be used as evidence in criminal cases, much crime (and notably 
offences involving dishonesty) will in practice be immune from 
prosecution’.  
 
The question is whether the Tanzanian Courts’ approach to interpretation of the TEA in 
the light of the digital technology leads to sensible results. In my view it does although 
some questions are still left unanswered. This is because the ruling in Trust Bank 
Tanzania Ltd has made it clear from the definitional point of view that a bankers’ book 
extends from the traditional bankers books, namely ledgers, day books, cash books, 
account -books to computer printouts. It has also confirmed that computer printout is a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
128 (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 196(Ont.H.C) 
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document within the provisions of the TEA. The Court has also settled that the 
authentication of computer printouts is the same as traditional bankers’ books. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
129 (1989) 2All E.R.208 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. Conclusion 
 
The development of digital technology in the last century has made profound impact on 
the traditional concepts of law and legal rules in the law of evidence. The body of rules 
governing the admissibility of documentary evidence has been severely strained. The 
principle problem lies in the definition of document that does not adequately reflect the 
electronic environment. In most common law jurisdictions the term document had been 
defined in reference to tangible media. Modern technologies especially the computer 
has made it possible for a document to exist in intangible medium. The so called soft 
copy in the language of computer scientists falls outside the traditional definitions of 
document in most evidence statutes including the TEA. 
 
There are also other concepts which have brought difficulties in interpretation of 
evidence statutes. The terms original and copy of an electronic document are clear 
illustrations. The question is: what is an original and what is a copy as between 
computer data and computer printouts? These two questions have rarely been precisely 
answered. In some common law jurisdictions computer printouts are treated as original 
while in others copy. In each case the status of computer data is left unattended. In 
addition to the above general conceptual problems, the TEA has special problems with 
the definition of bankers’ books. The law lacks a definition of bankers’ books. 
Unfortunately the first case law in Tanzania to address this lacuna emerged in the 
context of computer printout. Although the court determined that computer printout is a 
bankers’ book, it left some questions unanswered.  
 
Besides conceptual dilemmas, the traditional rules of admissibility of documentary 
evidence have been challenged too. The best evidence rule which requires an original 
document to be produced in court whenever reliance is put on its contents has been 
encroached upon by digital technology. The determination of the original and copy 
under the TEA as pointed out is still problematic. 
 
The rule against hearsay has similarly been strained. Its application has led to the 
distinction between computer output as a result of some human intervention and those 
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automatically generated by the computer. The hearsay rule has been held to apply to the 
former when truth of assertion is at issue in court. Despite this categorization the rule is 
still difficult to be applied in the computerized context. In some jurisdictions like United 
Kingdom, the hearsay rule has been abolished in civil proceedings and relaxed to a large 
extent in criminal proceedings. No case regarding admissibility of computer printouts 
has been tested in court on the basis of hearsay rule under the TEA. 
 
The authentication rule has also been affected. Generally there has been an additional 
requirement of foundation evidence as to the operation of the computer system at all 
material time. In some jurisdictions the standard is higher than in others. In Tanzania 
this aspect has never been litigated except in admissibility of bankers’ books where the 
court extended traditional safeguards to bankers’ books in the form of computer 
printouts. 
 
One thing which can be generally said about the law and practice of admissibility of 
documentary evidence across the common law jurisdictions is that there are no 
consistent approaches. Whereas in some jurisdictions legislative response has been 
quickly taken to amend the old laws in some other jurisdictions like Tanzania reliance is 
still heavily put on the traditional rules with slight and slow judicial innovation. Besides 
this apparent difference the content of the law is sometimes not the same.  
 
5.1 Recommendations 
 
The main recommendation advanced in this thesis is the amendment of the TEA to 
reflect the development of the new technologies. The main justifications in favour of the 
above proposal are three. First, the judiciary is not better placed to respond to the 
technological revolution of the computer as it cannot answer hypothetical legal 
questions and must always wait for an actual lawsuit to be filed. This implies that it will 
take long time for the law to develop on a case to case basis while legal certainty is 
immediately required by businesses and individuals. Second, it is the call from the 
judiciary itself to the legislature. This call was made specifically by the High Court of 
Tanzania (Commercial Division) in the landmark case of Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd. The 
Judge said: 
  
 58
                                                
 
‘As I have stated above, in as much as I subscribe to the view that the 
court should not be ignorant of modern business methods and shut its 
eyes to the mysteries of the computer, it would, however, have been 
much better if the position were clarified beyond all doubt by 
legislation rather than by judicial intervention.’(Emphasis supplied) 
 
Although no specific reasons were advanced by the Judge in the above invitation, it 
appears that the changing circumstances of technology previously not contemplated in 
the TEA required specific legislative measures.  
 
Third, there is the difficulty of employing traditional methods of statutory interpretation 
to old concepts in the electronic environment. 
 
In light of the above, this thesis recommends that first, the definition of the term 
document in section 3(1) (d) of the TEA be re-worded in order to accommodate the 
electronic document. Since modern technologies are dynamic and continue to change, 
the new definition should not make reference to a particular technology. In other words 
the provision must be technologically neutral to take into account future innovations. A 
useful point of departure for re-definition could be the US FRE definition130: 
 
‘Writings and recordings.—‘‘Writings’’ and ‘‘recordings” consist of 
letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set down by 
handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, 
magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other form 
of data compilation.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130 Rule 1001(1) of the US FRE. 
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Secondly, the concept of original and copy in sections 64(4), 65, and 79 of the TEA 
should be revised to precisely provide for the status of computer printouts. The USA has 
clarified the status of computer printout in Rule 1001(3) of FRE which provides 
categorically that if data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other 
output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an original. It is 
recommended that this definition should be avoided, and a computer printout should 
instead be treated as a copy under the TEA. This approach will reflect the logic that 
computer input data are original and any output is a copy. It means that computer 
printouts should always be admitted in court as secondary evidence so long they 
accurately reflect the original data input. This approach is applicable in the Nigeria and 
the USA in states which have not transposed the FRE. The justification for admission as 
copy was stated in the Mississippi case of King v. State for Use and Benefit of Murdock 
Acceptance Corp131 in the USA. In this case the court said that information stored in the 
computer constituted the original, and the printout was the copy. The copy was 
admissible as secondary evidence as the original was unavailable, being in a form 
which was not readable. 
 
Thirdly, the definition of bankers’ book should be introduced in section 74 of the TEA. 
It is recommended that the definition of bankers’ books under the English law as cited 
with approval in the Tanzanian case of Trust Bank Tanzania Ltd should be adopted. 
This definition is technologically neutral and will take into account future development 
in technology regarding banking business. 
 
 
Fourthly, the definition of the term computer and computer printout should be added in 
section 3(1) (d) of the TEA to define the scope of the machines whose printouts may be 
recognized by courts as computer printouts. This will avoid ambiguities from use of 
other types of machines not categorized as computers in ordinary language but with 
 
 
 
 
 
 
131 222 So.2d 393 (Miss. 1969), noted in 41 Miss.L.J. 604 (1970). 
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similar functions. As a point of departure the South African Computer Evidence Act, 
1983132 is recommended: 
 
 
'computer' means any device or apparatus, whether commonly called a 
computer or not, which by electronic, electro-mechanical, mechanical 
or other means is capable of receiving or absorbing data and 
instructions supplied to it, of processing such data according to 
mathematical or logical rules and in compliance with such 
instructions, of storing such data before or after such processing, and 
of producing information derived from such data as a result of such 
processing; 
 
'computer print-out' means the documentary form in which 
information is produced by a computer or a copy or reproduction of it, 
and includes, whenever any information needs to be transcribed, 
translated or interpreted after its production by the computer in order 
that it may take a documentary form and be intelligible to the court, a 
transcription, translation or interpretation of it which is calculated to 
have that effect; 
 
Fifthly, the provisions requiring authentication of electronic documents like computer 
printouts should be introduced in PARTS III and IV of the TEA. Foundation evidence of 
reliability of the computer system should be provided for in sections 34B and 34 C; 
PART III and IV. The standard should not be too high. A tier system of expert and non-
expert should be used to provide explanation of system reliability. Affidavits may also 
be used for this purpose. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 Section 1(1) 
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The hearsay provisions in sections 34, 34B and 34C should be reconsidered generally in 
the light of admissibility of electronic evidence. This should be done after assessing 
local circumstances. The UK approach of abolishing hearsay in civil proceedings is 
recommended. However other safeguards must be put in place to ensure reliability of 
the computer system. This approach should not be introduced in the criminal 
proceedings whose standard of proof is too high. 
 
In implementing the above proposals it is further recommended that the necessary 
details should be included in the text of the law. This is because in common law 
countries preparatory works have often not been given a great deal of weight in the 
interpretation of statutory legal text to which the works have led.133This also applies in 
Tanzania. But this is not to say that statutory legal text should contain every detail. It 
only means that there should be a balance between the details included in the text and 
the preparatory works. This is in sharp contrast to the jurisprudence of some of the civil 
law jurisdictions where preparatory works are not given a great deal of weight in 
interpretation of statutory legal text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
133 Stone J. Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasonings, Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 1964, 
p. 32. 
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